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Speakers for the March 1st “Sustaining the Zika 
Response in 2017” Presentations
Epidemiology Task Force - Carolyn Gould
Pregnancy and Birth Defects Task Force - Peggy Honein/Dana Meaney-Delman
Laboratory Task Force  - Eddie Ades/Wendi Kuhnert-Tallman
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Medical Investigations Team - Maleeka Glover
Joint Information Center  - Erin Connelly
Policy & Partnerships - Sue Visser/Melody Stevens 
Vector Issues Task Force – John-Paul Mutebi
Epidemiology Task Force
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Zika virus in the United States 
 From 2007–2014, 14 Zika virus disease cases identified in US travelers
 With recent outbreaks in the Americas, cases among US travelers increased 
substantially
 Limited local mosquito-borne transmission identified in two states (Florida 
and Texas)
 Outbreaks in three US territories (Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, and 
American Samoa) 
Duffy et al. N Eng J Med 2009; Hennessey et al. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2016; Armstrong et al. MMWR 2016; 
Walker et al. MMWR 2016; Likos et al. MMWR 2016; Dirlikov et al. MMWR 2016.
Laboratory-confirmed Zika virus disease cases reported to 
ArboNET by states or territories — United States, 2015–





Travel-associated 4,748 (94%) 141 (<1%)
Locally acquired 220 (4%) 36,882 (99%)
Other routes* 72 (1%) 0 (0%)
http://www.cdc.gov/zika/geo/united-states.html
*Includes sexual transmission (n=44), congenital infection (n=26), laboratory 
transmission (n=1), and person-to-person through an unknown route (n=1)
State of residence for reported Zika virus disease and presumptive 







blood donors†  
(N=36)
New York 1,020 (21%) 2 (6%)
Florida 1,069* (21%) 24 (67%)
California 420 (9%) 5 (14%)
Texas 306* (6%) 3 (8%)
New Jersey 176 (4%) 0 (0%)
Pennsylvania 173 (4%) 0 (0%)
Maryland 130 (3%) 0 (0%)
http://www.cdc.gov/zika/geo/united-states.html* Include 210 cases in FL and 6 cases in TX acquired through presumed 
local mosquito-borne transmission
† People who reported no symptoms at the time of donating blood, but whose blood tested positive when screened for the presence of Zika virus 
RNA by the blood collection agency. Some presumptive viremic blood donors develop symptoms after their donation or may have had symptoms 
in the past. These individuals may be reported as both Zika virus disease cases and presumptive viremic blood donors.
Reported Zika virus disease and presumptive viremic blood 









Puerto Rico 35,930 (97%) 318 (100%)
US Virgin Islands 973 (3%) 0 (0%)
American Samoa 120 (<1%) 0 (0%)
http://www.cdc.gov/zika/geo/united-states.html
† People who reported no symptoms at the time of donating blood, but whose blood tested positive when screened for the presence of Zika virus 
RNA by the blood collection agency. Some presumptive viremic blood donors develop symptoms after their donation or may have had symptoms 
in the past. These individuals may be reported as both Zika virus disease cases and presumptive viremic blood donors.
Month of illness onset for Zika virus disease cases —







































































Month of illness onset
States (N=4,930)
Territories (N=35,784)
Objectives of Zika virus surveillance in the United States 
 Quantify and describe disease burden 
 Identify and define areas with local mosquito-borne transmission
 Direct prevention and control efforts
 Identify and monitor infections in people at risk for poor outcomes
Continued reporting of Zika virus diseases cases
 Zika virus disease and infection are nationally notifiable
- CSTE updated case definitions in 7/2016*
• Includes non-congenital and congenital infection and disease 
 Healthcare providers should continue to report suspected cases to their 
state or local health department
 State health departments should continue to report laboratory-confirmed 
cases to CDC according to CSTE case definitions
 Timely reporting allows health departments to assess and reduce the risk 
of local transmission or mitigate further spread
*http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.cste.org/resource/resmgr/2016PS/16_ID_01_edited7.29.pdf
Surveillance strategies to identify possible local 
transmission during mosquito season 
 Survey household members and neighbors of travel-associated cases
 Monitor blood donor screening 
 Investigate unusual clusters of rash illness in areas at high risk
 Expand testing for people with no known exposure but more specific 
constellation of clinical findings
- For example: patient with fever, rash, and conjunctivitis in area with 
known vector mosquitoes
Preparing for next season
 Reassess risk areas, populations, and timing
 Continue to educate healthcare providers and local public health officials 
about Zika virus 
 Reassess public health laboratory testing and surge capacity
 Revisit testing capacity and reporting with commercial laboratories
 Update response plans with mosquito control districts
 Continue to coordinate with blood collection agencies
Ongoing challenges for the next season
 Optimal and cost effective approaches to identifying local transmission
 Surveillance strategies for determining extent of local transmission
 Defining travel exposure risk (e.g., border region)
 Identifying likely exposure location of confirmed cases
 Diagnostic issues – cross-reactivity, false positives
- Differential diagnosis may require testing for other pathogens
 Communicating risk and delineation of risk areas 
 Timely and appropriate travel and testing guidance
 Correlating human risks with vector surveillance data
Pregnancy and Birth Defects Task Force
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What have we learned? 
Established that 
Zika is a cause 
of microcephaly, 
serious brain 
defects, and is 




with evidence of 
Zika infection in the 
1st trimester,    
about 11% of 
fetuses and infants 
had birth defects
Recognized pattern 
of birth defects 
associated with Zika 
virus infection called 
congenital 
Zika syndrome
Identified that Zika 
infections during the 
1st and 2nd
trimester have 
been associated with 
birth defects
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What do we hope to learn in the next year?
USZPR ZBDS
ZAPSS
• Identify full range of health effects among infants with 
congenital Zika exposure
• Determine optimal Zika virus testing to identify infants 
with congenital Zika virus infection
• Understand how neuroimaging will help identify 
infants with adverse effects of congenital Zika infection
• Understand implications of Zika RNA persistence in 
pregnant women and infants 
• Assess risk of other adverse outcomes associated with 
Zika infection during pregnancy
• Use data to inform clinical management of pregnant 




• CDC collaborated with state and local jurisdictions on 
travel and testing guidance of pregnant women for Health 
Alert Network (HAN) notices
• Deployed pregnancy and birth defects expert as part of the 
CDC Emergency Response Team
• Partnered with state and local jurisdictions and local 
chapters of clinical partner organizations to increase 
outreach to healthcare providers 
19
What worked?
Development of Clinical Tools and Guidance
Zika Pregnancy Testing Algorithm Pretest Counseling Materials 20
Assessing for Zika During Pregnancy
• All pregnant women should be assessed for possible Zika exposure, signs, and symptoms 
at each prenatal care visit. They should be asked if they
• Traveled to or live in an area with active Zika transmission
• Had sex without a condom with a partner with potential exposure to Zika
Link: http://www.cdc.gov/zika/pdfs/zikapreg_screeningtool.pdf
CDC Recommendations: Who Should be Tested
Pregnant women with possible exposure to Zika virus 
and signs or symptoms should be tested for Zika virus 
infection
Pregnant women with possible exposure to Zika virus 
who do not report symptoms also should tested
Pregnant women with ongoing risk of Zika virus exposure 
and who do not report symptoms should be tested in the 
1st and 2nd trimesters of pregnancy
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm6529e1.htm?s_cid=mm6529e1_e
What worked?
Collaboration with Jurisdictions on US Zika Pregnancy 
Registry & US Zika Birth Defects Surveillance
• Regular reporting and joint publication of findings
• ELC M2: Funding to support US Zika Pregnancy Registry efforts
• Provided funding to support population-based surveillance of birth defects 
potentially related to Zika virus
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Pregnant Women with Any Laboratory Evidence of 











Completed Pregnancies with or without birth 
defects
Includes aggregated data reported to the US Zika 
Pregnancy Registry
What worked?
Local Health Department Field Support 
16 jurisdictions applied for CDC 
resource assignee to support:
• Clinical outreach 
• Community outreach / health 
communications
• Medical abstraction
• Data collection, validation, 
investigation
• Monitoring and follow up




• CDC-developed MAC-ELISA (February 26, 2016) and Trioplex rRT-PCR (March 
17, 2016) tests receive first FDA EUA to diagnose Zika virus infection 
• CDC continues to manufacture and distribute reagents for these assays 
domestically and internationally
• CDC laboratories provide confirmatory testing and surge capacity for Zika virus





Number of Specimesn Tested by 
Zika IgM MAC-ELISA
CDC-Atlanta 5,023 3,464 2,827
CDC-Fort Collins 18,262 3,926 15,571
CDC-San Juan 81,667 45,136 48,015
LRN 60,788 25,439 35,349




• Limited data on viral persistence and impact on testing algorithms
• Specificity of diagnostic assays
• In-house evaluation of 3 commercial assays with MAC-ELISA as gold standard
• Usefulness of PRNT
• Crossreactivity due to past flavivirus infections
• Turn around time from sample receipt to when results reach physicians
• Discussions ongoing to pursue HL7 messaging to decrease time from test completion to 
results being available to a physician
Manufacturer Sensitivity Specificity
InBios (EUA approved) 82% 85%




• Provide Zika virus SME and reference laboratory support in Fort Collins 
• Maintain surge laboratories for Zika diagnostic testing in Atlanta
• Assist state and territorial laboratories, as needed
• Refine performance of diagnostic assays
• Move testing to commercial laboratories
• New research
29
Move testing to commercial laboratories
• Early in response CDC entered into agreements with the 4 nation-wide 
commercial laboratories
• Provided MAC-ELISA reagents free of charge to encourage testing until 
additional serology assays achieved EUA approval
• Challenges with reporting and assay performance
• Movement of testing will decrease surge needs for CDC laboratories 
• 12 PCR assays currently approved (including Trioplex)
• 2 IgM assay currently approved (including MAC-ELISA)
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New Research:  Improvement of Molecular and Serologic
Diagnostic Tools for Zika Virus (all CDC laboratories)
 Improve sensitivity of high-throughput rRT-PCR by specimen volume or type
 Studies ongoing to evaluate serum, whole blood and urine to evaluate 
sensitivity of each
 Development of a Zika Virus multiplex Bead Assay (IgM/IgG)
 Investigation of more specific antibodies 
 Development of rapid and specific IgM diagnostic test using mass 
spectrometry
 Refinement of recombinant antigens in testing platforms to eliminate the 
need for inactivation of live virus
31
Blood Safety Task Force
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Blood Safety Task Force 
Background on Blood, Organ, and Tissue Collection/Screening
Blood
• Types of collection: whole blood and apheresis
• Types of products: red blood cells, platelets, plasma
• Screening: hepatitis B/C, HIV, human T-lymphotropic virus (HTLV), syphilis, West Nile 
virus, and Zika virus 
Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-based Products (HCT/Ps)
• Types of products: corneas, bone, skin, heart valves, hematopoietic stem/progenitor 
cells (HPCs), reproductive tissues, etc.
• Screening: hepatitis B/C, HIV, HTLV, syphilis, cytomegalovirus, chlamydia, gonorrhea  
Solid Organs
• Types of products: kidney, heart, liver, etc.
33
Blood Safety Task Force
Blood Safety
• No confirmed Zika virus transfusion-transmitted cases in the United States
• Probable Zika virus transfusion-transmitted cases in Brazil
• US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued industry guidance on Feb.
20161 and revised guidance on Aug 20162
• Blood collection centers in all states and US territories should perform 
Zika virus screening on all donations using a screening test authorized  
for use under an FDA investigational new drug (IND) protocol, or with 
a licensed test when available; or use an FDA-approved pathogen-
reduction device for plasma and certain platelet products 
1 https://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/Blood/UCM486360.pdf
2 https://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/Blood/UCM518213.pdf 34
Blood Safety Task Force
https://www.cdc.gov/zika/transmission/blood-transfusion.html 35
Blood Safety Task Force
The areas listed under “Areas 
of Active Transmission in the 
U.S.” can differ from those 
issued for travel guidance's 
because of additional 
concerns about potential risk 
for tissue safety.
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Blood Safety Task Force
Tissue Safety
• FDA’s March 20161 guidance included Zika virus-related:
• Recommendations for living donors
• Recommendations for non-heart-beating (cadaveric) donors
Organ Safety
• No Zika virus guidance has  been issued by Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA), but the Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network (OPTN) issued a statement on Zika virus on July 20162




Blood Safety Task Force
Key Messages
• Blood donation screening can help public health identify new 
areas of transmission 
• State health departments (SHDs) and blood banks should ensure 
procedures are in place for sharing information regarding positive 
blood donors
• Presumptive viremic donors (PVDs) should be reported to ArboNET
• SHDs and tissue banks should strengthen communication 




Joint Information Center (JIC)
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Joint Information Center 
Zika—a threat like no other 
 The most complex communication challenge in CDC (and US public health) history 
• More risks and more unknowns
• Diverse audiences, various languages and divided opinions
 Guiding communication principles for response
• Evidence-based communication strategy
• Coordination and consistency at all levels of government   
• Research to understand audience needs and behaviors in the midst of rapidly changing information 
• Collaboration with the community to inform strategy, mobilize partners, and amplify messages
• Continuous, real-time evaluation driving adjustments to strategies and tactics 
Communication – One Year Later
 Intensive, multisector initiatives, including health marketing 
and private-sector partnerships, can influence awareness and 
behaviors
 In some higher risk areas, not all pregnant women are aware 
of Zika, its effects on health, or how to protect themselves 
 Preventive actions most often mentioned by audiences 
aware of Zika were 
 1) Wearing repellent
 2) Dumping accumulated water
 “Invisibility” of Zika may contribute to complacency among 
audiences who aren’t personally at risk
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Joint Information Center 
Communication Strategy
 ZAP Summit communication planning– Spring 2016
• Create a written, strategic communication plan 
• Include goals, objectives, target audiences, tactics, key messages and evaluation metrics
• Revisit and update the plan throughout the response 
• Currently updating for 2017 
 Incorporate core risk communication principles in the plan 
• Show empathy
• Say what you know, what you don’t know, and what you’re doing to find out
• Crisis & Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) resources: https://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc 
 Direct all communication activities toward achieving the goals of the plan
Joint Information Center 
Communication Response
 Coordinate between local, state, and federal entities through clear lines of 
communication 
• Harmonize and amplify communication strategy
• Consistent messaging builds credibility with the public
 Communicate with the public about the things that are important to them
• Understand the public’s concerns and respond to them 
• Provide frequent press briefings and media access to the response
 Strengthen the response through robust engagement with community partners, all 
types 
• Those with other points of view can help to identify communication needs and gaps
• Engaged partners can act as channels to reach other audiences
Joint Information Center 
Communication Research
 Ground your strategy in research 
• Use convenient and ad hoc information sources to learn about what people do and do not know
•Monitor local media and social media for themes, misinformation, and gaps
•Track questions through all public and media inquiry sources (phone calls, emails, social media)
• Real-time communication research can track message uptake and behavior change
 Refine the communication strategy based on what you learn
• Add or revise tactics, channels, spokespeople, and messages 
• Update and reinforce information through your own channels, the news media, and partners




In partnership with the CDC Foundation, CDC continues to grow 
vital relationships with public and private sector partners 
The partnerships team cultivates partnerships in the areas of 
• Protecting pregnant women
• Ensuring access to contraception















Leveraging Partnerships to Help Decrease the Health Impact of Zika 
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White House Blog on Zika and Business Engagement
“This is a fight that 
“This is a fight that 
will continue to 
require the best we 
can offer from the 
government, the 
private sector, and our 
communities – and it 
will require 








Amy Pope, Immediate Past Deputy Homeland Security Advisor and Deputy Assistant 
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Vector Issues Task Force
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 Funding provided via the ELC M1 
mechanism for Zika vector control 
and surveillance 
 Aug 2016: FY16 funding ($18M) 
awarded to 63 entities, including 
CONUS states as well as some CONUS 
cities, AK, HI, PR and Territories 
 Dec 2016: FY17 funding ($27M) 
awarded to 23 entities, mostly 
southern CONUS states, HI, and 
territories 
ELC M1 funded Aedes aegypti/albopictus




 Updated survey for county-level records, Jan 1995 to Dec 2016
Second Stegomyia survey
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Aedes aegypti Aedes albopictus
• Records for Ae. aegypti from 220 counties across 28 states and D.C. (38 new counties, mostly in TX, KS, CA; 2 new 
states, AL, IL)
• Records for Ae. albopictus from 1,368 counties across 40 states and D.C. (127 new counties, mostly in TX, KS, AR, NC)
Mosquito surveillance in Texas
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141 counties in Texas now have documented presence of one or both Stegomyia species (Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus): 
65 counties have documented the presence of both species
55 counties have documented the presence of Ae. albopictus only
21 counties have documented the presence of Ae. aegypti only
MosquitoNET online mosquito surveillance and                                          
insecticide resistance data reporting 
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https://www.cdc.gov/zika/vector/vector-control.html
 Key outputs from the data collected and reported to CDC
 Moving toward more standardized vector surveillance
o Improved data/knowledge on the biology of immatures and 
adults across CONUS, and evaluation of data for specific 
surveillance methods, should lead to revised, more 
standardized surveillance schemes
 Mapping
o County-based presence of Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus
o Point locations for collections of Ae. aegypti and Ae. 
albopictus
o County-based insecticide susceptibility/resistance 
patterns
 Modeling
o Sub-county level predictive models for presence of Ae. 
aegypti and Ae. albopictus
o Sub-county level predictive models for abundance of Ae. 




 New CDC-funded mosquito control initiatives
 Regional Centers of Excellence for Vector-Borne Diseases have been funded and 
are active (FL, TX, NY, WI): $40M
 BARDA call for sole source contract to Evolva to develop EPA-registered natural 
product (nootkatone)-based mosquito repellents and toxicants closed 2/15: $9M
 Five new mosquito control research projects are being funded (BAA): $5M
 AMCA was funded to strengthen national mosquito control capacity: $1.6M
o Manual for best mosquito management practices has been updated and is 
available online
o New online and hands-on mosquito control training programs are nearing 
completion
o Master-trainers for these programs will be trained in March
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For more information, contact CDC  
1-800-CDC-INFO (232-4636)
TTY: 1-888-232-6348 www.cdc.gov
The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the  
official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Thank You!
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